Based on the author's thesis (doctoral)--European University Institute, 2007.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

The enduring debate on the nature of vertical agreements -- Theorising vertical restraints : the intellectual foundations of EC competition law and US antitrust models -- Questioning the achievement of an adequate economic analysis -- The impact of competition rules on vertical contractural relationships.

"This book focuses on the current legal framework for vertical agreements in the EU and the US. Over the last ten years, antitrust rules governing these agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EU, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation 2790/99, applicable to all sectors of the economy. In addition, changes introduced to the procedural rules have led to the decentralisation of Article 81(3) and the removal of the notification requirement. In like manner, in the US the Supreme Court has gradually taken vertical restraints out of the per se illegality rule. What Sylvania achieved in placing non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason in the late 1970s, the Khan judgment did for maximum resale price maintenance in 1997, whilst most recently and most significantly in 2007 the Leegin case followed suit for minimum resale price maintenance."--BOOK JACKET.

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